Review of policies affecting farmland mobility in France by Latruffe, Laure & Le Mouël, Chantal
HAL Id: hal-02283460
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02283460
Submitted on 10 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Review of policies affecting farmland mobility in France
Laure Latruffe, Chantal Le Mouël
To cite this version:
Laure Latruffe, Chantal Le Mouël. Review of policies affecting farmland mobility in France. [Research
Report] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2006, 22 p. ￿hal-02283460￿
JADE#38191 
 
Review of policies affecting farmland mobility in France 
 
 
 
Laure Latruffe and Chantal Le Mouël 
1
 
 
INRA-ESR, 4 allée A. Bobierre, CS 61 103, 35 011 Rennes cedex, France 
Laure.Latruffe@rennes.inra.fr ; Chantal.LeMouel@rennes.inra.fr 
 
 
 
 
Report for the OECD, Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
 
 
 
15 September 2006 
                                                     
1
 The authors are very grateful to Frédéric Courleux, Pierre Dupraz, Hervé Guyomard and Michel Pech for 
valuable discussions. 
 1
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 2 
2. Policies affecting farmland mobility between different uses ...................................................................... 3 
2.1. Conversion to non-agricultural uses..................................................................................................... 3 
Conversion to urbanized land.................................................................................................................. 3 
Conversion to forest or idle land ............................................................................................................. 4 
2.2. Environmental restrictions ................................................................................................................... 5 
2.3. Common Agricultural Policy ............................................................................................................... 6 
Crop vs. livestock production.................................................................................................................. 6 
Production vs. non-production ................................................................................................................ 8 
2.4. Potential effect of the recent changes in the CAP ................................................................................ 8 
3. Policies affecting farmland mobility between different operators .............................................................. 9 
3.1. Policies affecting the transfer of land between farmers ....................................................................... 9 
Inheritance rules ...................................................................................................................................... 9 
Rules regarding the purchase and sale of land ...................................................................................... 10 
Land rental contract characteristics ....................................................................................................... 12 
3.2. Policies affecting the entry or exit of farmers in/from the farming sector ......................................... 13 
Pre-retirement measures ........................................................................................................................ 13 
Provisions to support young farmers’ settlement .................................................................................. 14 
Incentives to entry or remain in the sector ............................................................................................ 15 
3.3. Potential effect of the recent changes in the policies ......................................................................... 15 
4. Conclusion................................................................................................................................................. 16 
References ..................................................................................................................................................... 19 
 2
1. Introduction 
Farmland mobility has two broad meanings. The first meaning is the mobility between different uses of 
land. This encompasses conversion of farmland to/from non-agricultural use, as well as modification of the 
agricultural production on the land (e.g. change from pasture to arable land). Mobility is reduced between 
different sectors if there exists restriction regarding the conversion of land into another use. As for mobility 
between different uses of land within the farming sector, it is reduced if policies favor one production at the 
expense of the others, even if in some areas the marginal productivity of land would call for another 
production to be realized. The second definition that can be attributed to farmland mobility is the mobility 
between different land operators. Also known as the change of hands, this aspect deals with entry and exit of 
farmers into/from the farming sector, and exchange of land on the agricultural sale or rental markets. Mobility 
is reduced if legal provisions give incentives to existing farmers to keep the same farming area or to operator 
landowners to keep their land in their family during succession, even if land would be more productive if used 
by other farmers. 
Policies affecting the mobility of land are different whether one considers the first or second concept. 
Mobility between different uses will be mainly influenced by the commodity support policies, as well as legal 
restrictions regarding the conversion to non-agricultural uses or environmental restrictions. By contrast, 
mobility between operators will be influenced by policies intervening on the exchange markets (e.g. pre-
emptive rights), on asset transmission (e.g. inheritance rules) and on incentives to enter or leave the farming 
sector (e.g. early retirement measures). 
In both cases of mobility, policies might reduce a mobility that would happened naturally if only market 
forces were in action. In case of free market, land would go to the most productive use and to the most 
efficient operator. Public intervention might however influence the mobility in favor of one particular 
production, or specific farmers. While the objective of government intervention is generally to protect farmers’ 
income, in the end, it might reduce the productivity and competitiveness of the farming sector as whole. 
This paper reviews the national and European laws and provisions, that might possibly influence farmland 
mobility in France, in both definitions, and draw some potential implications of the recent changes in policies, 
both national and European. The next section deals with mobility between uses, while section 3 explains the 
mobility between operators. 
 3
2. Policies affecting farmland mobility between different uses 
Land can be utilized for various uses, such as agriculture, housing, leisure activities, transport, industries, 
etc. All these activities are in competition for the land, and their localization should be ruled by the return to 
land, depending on the type of land and the possible uses. However, demographic pressure in industrialized 
countries has considerably increased the demand for building land over the last century. This pressure has been 
playing at the expense of the farming sector, due to a large discrepancy in prices, prompting governments to 
draft legal provisions restraining the conversion of land from agricultural use and its flow out of the 
agricultural sector. 
Within the farming sector itself, land can be devoted to various utilizations, that is to say can be used for 
various productions. While the law of demand, combined with the soil quality, should decide which production 
should be carried out in which area, public support to agriculture implemented after the Second World War has 
largely biased farmers’ decisions, in favor of specific productions. 
 
2.1. Conversion to non-agricultural uses 
Conversion to urbanized land 
As in the majority of countries, land in France is categorized according to its use by development planning 
provisions, and therefore, land devoted to agriculture is officially notified as agricultural land. Converting 
agricultural land into another use (housing, industries, recreational areas, etc) is subjected to approval by the 
State or its local administration. Before 1983 the Ministry of Agriculture was the sole decision-maker for the 
whole country. After this date the decentralization process gave this power to municipalities. These establish 
the so-called “Plans Locaux d’Urbanisme” (PLUs, previously known as “Plans d’Occupation des Sols” POS) 
for a given period (less than 10 years), that is to say they map their area and decide for each plot what will be 
its main use during the period. The PLUs share the municipality land into several zones according to their use: 
the urban zones, the zones to be urbanized, the agricultural zones, the natural and forest zones (CES, 2005). A 
PLU protects agricultural land from conversion into development. It is very difficult for landowners to change 
the use of their land if such change does not comply to the municipality’s map. Building permission is given to 
projects which are in accordance to the PLU; or, when a municipality has no PLU, projects can be refused if 
they are threatening agricultural activities or land consolidation. In addition, since 1999 municipalities’ land 
might comprise protected agricultural areas (ZAP, “Zones d’Agriculture Protégée”), due to their specific 
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interest in terms of regional production (Code Rural, 2000). In this case, a change in use is possible only after 
the county’s (“département”) public authority and Agricultural Chamber have given permission. 
Such provisions aimed at reducing the mobility of agricultural land outside the sector. However, despite 
these provisions, the protection of agricultural land is far from certain: ZAP are relatively rare and PLUs can 
be, and are often modified, which threatens the existence of agricultural land. Small municipalities in particular 
are interested in industrial development in order to get more financial resources, and in housing development 
as well, as inhabitants are also voters of the local representatives. Such pressure on the agricultural land is 
particularly felt in tourist regions or around urban poles. Moreover, not only municipalities might show laxness 
when giving building permissions, but they themselves have urban pre-emptive rights (“Droits de Pré-emption 
Urbains”). This means that they can confiscate any land in their area, against compensation, in order to build 
roads, railways, recreational activities etc. Agricultural land is more and more concerned by this right. 
It is estimated that each year in France 80,000 ha are converted from agriculture into another use, 30,000 ha 
used for urbanization and 50,000 ha used for recreation (CES, 2005). The total utilized agricultural area in 
France has decreased from 34.4 million ha in 1950 to 29.8 million ha in 2005, that is to say a reduction of 
almost 5 million ha in 50 years, almost 10 per cent of the territory (Agreste, 2006). Although this seems to be 
relatively important quantitatively, the policy provisions described above very much restrain the mobility of 
agricultural land to urban usage, which would be much greater if the move was free, as the large discrepancy 
between prices of agricultural land and building land suggests.
2
 
Conversion to forest or idle land 
The second type of conversion affecting agricultural land is its transformation into wooded or idle (non-
maintained) land. 
Forestation of agricultural land is undertaken by owners who cannot find any or unsatisfactory successor 
for their land, and consider the return of wooden land (for them or their offspring) as higher than the receipts 
from sale or renting. No legal restrictions or constraints are applied to such conversion. Since 1992 farmers can 
benefit from aids co-financed by the EU and the State. Such provision was introduced in the frame of the 1992 
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 For example, on French rural land sale markets in 2005, the market price of one hectare of building land 
was in average 39 times higher than the market price of one hectare of arable and pasture land: i.e., 185,000 
euro/ha as compared to 4,750 euro/ha respectively (Terres d’Europe-Scafr, 2005). 
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CAP reform, and was part of the efforts to reduce the agricultural production in the EU. The aids can be up to 
22,000 euros per person, depending on the type of forestation and tree specie (Sondag, 1998). However, 
owners can benefit from those measures only if the new woodland adjoins an existing forest. In France mainly 
pasture land, rather than arable land, is affected by the supported conversion (80% of converted agricultural 
land between 1992 and 1997) (Sondag, 1998). 
Owners are more and more interested into conversion into wood, as such type of land is not subject to the 
property tax, on the opposite of agricultural land. However, the conversion from agricultural land to wooden 
land is still marginal, as reported by a study from the French Ministry of Environment over the past decade 
(Naizot, 2005). According to the study, only 0.04% of agricultural land has been converted into forest between 
1990 and 2000, while the opposite conversion (forest into agricultural land) accounts for 0.4% of the 
woodland. But, overall, forest area has been slowly but steadily increasing in France (Naizot, 2005). The share 
of the territory covered by forest has for example increased from 26.6 per cent to 28.3 per cent between 1980 
and 2005 (Agreste, 2006). 
Since 1976, in a view of controlling wine production, wine producers are given compensation for pulling 
out their vineyard and leaving it idle (but maintained), as part of the EU wine Common Market Organization 
(CMO) measures. Aids are up to 12,300 euros/ha, depending on the past observed liter yield (European 
Commission, 2006). Since 1996 Member States have the possibility to exclude part of or all their territory 
from this scheme, and since this date, the vineyard abandonment measures are used almost only in France 
(European Commission, 2006). Between 1988 and 2004 about 107,500 ha of vineyard have become unused in 
France (i.e, 11% of the whole French vineyard area). 
The above mentioned measures can in theory increase the mobility of land from agricultural use to other 
(natural) uses, but in reality the effect is very limited. 
 
2.2. Environmental restrictions 
Environmental restrictions are part of the European network Natura 2000. The network aims at conserving 
biodiversity and comprises two directives, one regarding the preservation of natural habitats, and one regarding 
the preservation of wild fauna and flora. These were transposed in the French law in 2001. Today, the 
delimitation of protected sites is almost completed in France, and accounts for 12% of the whole French 
territory (MEDD, 2006). 
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Once the delimitation is completed, Member States must introduce measures that will effectively allow the 
preservation of habitats, fauna and flora in these areas. In France will this will most probably involve the 
creation of nature reserves. In such areas, it would therefore imply less freedom for farmers to choose the 
production on their land, and thus reduce the mobility of land between usages. 
 
2.3. Common Agricultural Policy 
Since its launch, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been playing an important role on the use of 
land within agriculture. Support to various commodities gave incentives to farmers to produce more of specific 
crop or livestock than what would have been observed without support, while compulsory set-aside aimed at 
reducing production. In opposite, specific agri-environmental and rural development measures had for 
objective to keep production where it would otherwise likely disappear. 
Crop vs. livestock production 
Initially, price support was aimed at increasing the production in order to feed a ruined after-war Europe, 
while providing farmers with a guaranteed revenue. Price support was however larger for crops than for 
livestock, resulting in a move towards more land utilized for crop, as illustrated on Graph 1. In practice, 
pastures were transformed into arable land. 
On Graph 1 the equilibrium between crop and livestock in terms of area utilization is E1 if there are no 
subsidies; that is to say, the marginal profit without support determines solely the competitive equilibrium. 
Crop are produced over the area E1 and livestock productions use the area A-E1. When support is applied 
however, the marginal profit curves shift upward, the resulting curves being the hatched curves. Both before 
and after the 1992 CAP reform, the per hectare equivalent support devoted to crop (given through price 
support, then through direct aids) was higher than the one devoted to livestock. Hence, in Graph 1, the upward 
shift for crop marginal profit is more important. The equilibrium is now determined by E2, that is to say crop 
utilize more area (E2>E1) than if support was not given. 
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Graph 1: Land utilization by crop and livestock production: Equilibrium without and with support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the 1992 reform replaced market price support by direct payments (based on area or headage numbers) 
that were calculated exactly to compensate the price cuts, it was not expected to affect the trend towards crop 
area utilization. As for the Agenda 2000 reform, which did not significantly change the relative levels of 
support devoted to crop and livestock. At this stage, the trend towards crop cultivation, instead of pasture or 
fodder area, was only limited by the existence of the COP (cereals, oilseeds and protein crop) base eligible area 
at the national level. Each year a total COP area eligible to direct payments was fixed at the national level, and 
in case the observed COP area exceeded the base area, proportionally reduced direct payments were delivered 
to all farmers in the country.
3
 France registered six base area overshoots between 1993 and 1999 but due to 
some provisions of the penalty system and some granted exemptions, no sanction has never been truly applied 
(OECD, 2002). 
The CAP so far has therefore prevented land to be shifted freely from one type of production to the other, 
by freezing it into crop cultivation. This trend could in theory be balanced by another accompanying measure 
of the 1992 PAC reform, aimed at reducing crop production in the EU and at lessening the water pollution by 
fertilizers. This agri-environnemental measure is the possibility of aids for farmers to transform arable land 
into pasture. Such conversion should be kept during a minimum of five years, and must be followed by the 
                                                     
3
 From 1993 to 1996 an extraordinary set-aside requirement (proportional to the overshoot and not eligible 
for payment) was additionally applied. 
Crop 
marginal 
profit 
A = Total utilized area 
Livestock 
marginal 
profit 
E1 0 E2 
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implementation of a low stocking density (1.4 livestock unit/ha maximum) on the pastures (European 
Commission, 1998). However, in France, this effect is relatively minor, and mostly visible in some Western 
areas (Sarthe, Touraine, Sologne) and in Northern France (Ardennes) in the past decade (Naizot, 2005).  
Estimations over the past 50 years indicate that while arable land constituted 55.6% of the total utilized area 
in France in 1950, this share had increased up to 61.3% in 2000 (Agreste, 2006). The effect however varies 
regionally. Over the 90es for example it has been the most important in Eastern France (Lorraine), as well as 
around Paris (Beauce) and in central France (Massif Central) (Naizot, 2005). 
Production vs. non-production 
As part of the 1992 CAP reform, compulsory set-aside was introduced as a crop supply management 
instrument. Until the 2003 reform, farmers were required to put 15% (this percentage has varied from 5% to 
10% over the years) of their UAA into set-aside. In France this resulted in an increase of the share of arable 
land set into set-aside from 1.3% en 1990 to 7.1% in 2005 (Agreste, 2006). 
While set-aside requirements constitute measures supposed to prevent the use of land for production, the 
opposite incentive is given by specific measures in the rural development Pillar of the CAP. Such measures 
include the various measures targeted to Less Favored Areas (LFA). In France farmers in mountainous LFA 
can benefit from financial assistance, called the “Indemnité Compensatoire de Handicaps Naturels” (ICHN). 
This scheme was introduced as early as 1973 in France, and was included as part of the EU regulation of 1999 
and thus is co-financed for 50% by the EU. Beneficiaries are those who are aged 65 or less and for which 80% 
of the farm is located in such area (MAF, 2006). The maximum eligible area is 50 ha per farm. Farmers must 
in return continue farming for the next five years. This scheme, which benefits to more than 110,000 farmers 
in France, plays a significant role in keeping the UAA stable in isolated areas, as it represents on average one 
third of the revenue (outside this aid) of the concerned farmers (MAF, 2003). 
 
2.4. Potential effect of the recent changes in the CAP 
The main development in policies that might influence farmland mobility regards the recent 2003 CAP 
reform, which introduces further decoupling between support and production. Since 2005 direct payments are 
given to farmers in the form of rights, called “Droits à Paiement Unique” (DPU) in France, whose value and 
number are determined by the total support received by farmers in 2000-2002 and by their utilized area in the 
same period. Such payments per ha are therefore not linked to current production. Farmers are free to choose 
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any type or production on their land, as well as no production at all, providing that they keep their land in good 
agricultural and environmental conditions. 
Such decoupled payments should therefore stop the trend towards land utilization for crop production. 
Production decisions should now be solely based on marginal land productivity and market prices. Existing 
studies aimed at measuring market and welfare effects of the 2003 CAP reform all conclude that arable crop 
production should decrease in the EU15 mainly through a reduction in land devoted to this activity. At reverse, 
fodder and pasture area would increase (see, e.g., Gohin, 2005). However, France has opted for the partial 
recoupling option, with 25% of cereals and oilseeds payments remaining coupled, suckler cow payments being 
100% coupled, beef and veal slaughter payments being respectively 40% and 100% coupled and beef 
payments fully decoupled. This suggests that the trend towards land utilization for crop should not be 
discontinued quickly in France, that is to say that mobility between production uses is likely to increase only 
slowly. 
As for set-aside land, the rate of compulsory set-aside has been fixed to 10%, similar to past years. 
However, voluntary set-aside (the so-called land under good agricultural and environmental conditions) is now 
possible, with aids per ha of land in this modality being similar to any other land (DPU). Preliminary study in 
Europe however shows that farmers do not intend to use this possibility (FP6 project IDEMA). 
 
3. Policies affecting farmland mobility between different operators 
 
3.1. Policies affecting the transfer of land between farmers 
Inheritance rules 
The inheritance laws in France stipulate a mandatory transfer to rightful heirs. This means that, in opposite 
to the full testamentary freedom where the owner can draft a testimony, heirs are designated by law as well as 
the share of the property and other assets they are entitled to. Hence, the landowner is not free to choose 
her/his heirs, nor their respective share of the inheritance. Concretely, equal shares of the bequest are given to 
children, and only since recently the widow spouse is considered in the sharing out. 
Commonly, none or only one (the successor) of the heirs are interested in utilizing the land that they 
inherited. Therefore, they would in general intend to sell or rent the land to farmers, implying a change in 
hands and thus enhancing the land mobility. 
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However, there are in practice several provisions that make this inheritance legal system less strict, in order 
to favor the farm successor over the other heirs. The first possibility is that the share of the property can be 
based on its value rather than the area; in this system, the heir succeeding on the farm can be attributed the 
whole bequest, and in return gives a compensation to his/her co-heirs for their shares. In this case the successor 
is helped by a public subsidy for paying the co-heirs’ shares, and can also receive a financial compensation for 
the time he/she has spent on the farm working with the parents, young farmers are usually highly indebted. A 
second possibility is that all heirs keep their ownership shares but create an association (“Groupement Foncier 
Agricole”, GFA) in order to rent out their land under long term contracts to the heir succeeding on the farm. 
The creation of a GFA is rewarded by partial inheritance tax exemption (up to 75% of the asset value if this 
value is lower than 76,000 euros, 50% for a value beyond). 
While such elements are aimed at preventing land fragmentation and farm dismantling, in parallel they 
lessen the possibility for the land to be re-attributed to more productive operators, and therefore likely 
contributes to reduce the mobility. 
The second important element regarding inheritance rules and their potential effects in terms of land 
mobility is the inheritance tax system. High taxes on inheritance are likely to force heirs to sell their inherited 
estate in order to be able to pay for the tax. In France there is a tax free allowance when the value of the 
bequest does not exceed 76,000 euros in case of a transmission between spouses, and 46,000 euros in case of a 
transmission between parents and children (lower for other relatives). The threshold is relatively low compared 
to other European countries (e.g. 256,000 euros in Germany, cf. Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). As for the tax 
itself, it is progressive, with a rate ranging from 5% to 40% of the value of the inherited property/assets. Such 
high inheritance taxes are likely to encourage heirs to sell the legacy, and thus are likely to enhance the move 
of land outside the family. 
Rules regarding the purchase and sale of land 
Regarding the transfer of land outside a succession, that is to say the purchase and sale of land, the first 
element likely to influence such transfer is also the taxation scheme. In France the transfer of land or property 
is subject to a total tax of 4.89 percent. This includes the tax for right to transfer of 3.60 percent, a county 
(“département”) tax of 0.09 percent, and a municipality tax of 1.20 percent. While this rate is slightly above of 
the majority of tax rates in Europe (see Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006), it is still much less than it was recently 
(16.20%, CES, 2005). This shows the will of the government to give incentives for land transfer, and thus 
should favor land mobility between operators. 
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The second element worth investigating is the possibility for farmers to benefit from financial aid during 
land purchase. However, although the French government extends preferential loans and grants, co-financed 
for 50 percent by the EU, for 6 credit lines, none of them is for land purchase. They deal with upgrading the 
farm buildings, purchasing livestock or plant equipment, or for starting farmers’ machinery cooperatives 
(“Cooperatives d’Utilisation de Matériel Agricole”, CUMA) (MAF, 2006). The absence of financial assistance 
in the purchase of land might decrease the demand for farmland, and hence reduce the mobility. 
The last key element deals with the existence of pre-emptive rights. On the justification that, if regulation 
was left to the market, agricultural land would disappear very quickly, the French authorities created, in 1960 
as part of the “Loi d’Orientation Agricole” (LOA, the broad national agricultural structural policy), private 
bodies aimed at regulating the transfer of farmland. These bodies, called SAFERs (“Sociétés d’Aménagement 
Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural”, one per “département”) have public service missions (functioning under the 
non-profit private law), and are controlled by the State. Their boards of Directors are generally composed of 
representatives of the agricultural professional organizations and of regional and local administrations. 
In order to fulfill their missions, SAFERs benefit from three main tools. The first tool is the obligation of 
information: each sale has to be notified to the SAFER of the “département”, by the notaries legalizing the 
transactions. This means that when the SAFER receives the information, market forces have first played, so 
that a first agreement has been reached between the seller and one buyer at a given price. The SAFER has then 
2 months to accept or to refuse the notified transaction. When market forces lead to a transaction that fits with 
the missions of the SAFER and cannot been suspected of speculation purpose, then the latter accepts the 
transaction. At reverse, when market forces result in a transaction that goes against the missions of the SAFER 
or is suspected of speculation purposes (e.g., a sale implying the dismantling of a farm, a sale allowing a 
settled farmer to enlarge his/her farm to the detriment of a young farmer that would have been able to settle 
thank to the land on sale, or an agreed price that is judged by the SAFER as non representative of market 
prices), then the SAFER can and usually does refuse the transaction. The second tool appears at this stage: this 
is negotiation power. This means that the SAFER undertakes a process of discussion with the seller and the 
buyer to try to reach a mutual agreement upon a new transaction (usually a new buyer who better fits SAFERs’ 
missions, or another price that is judged as more in line with observed market prices). Finally, the third tool, 
the most powerful one, is used only if a mutual agreement cannot be reached between the seller, the buyer and 
the SAFER: the pre-emptive right. This pre-emptive right allows the SAFER to acquire the land on sale and 
then to try to find an arrangement that better fits the SAFERs’ missions, e.g., to sell back the land to another 
buyer or at another price or to rent out the land. However, despite this powerful tool for influencing 
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agricultural land transactions, most of the problems are resolved with amicable agreement. According to 
SAFERs, they impose a price revision only rarely, e.g. 0.4% of the transactions in 2001 (SAFER, 2002). 
Originally, the missions of SAFERs were mainly to support the settlement of farmers, especially young 
farmers, to support land and farm consolidation and to favor transparency and functioning of rural land 
markets. Missions of SAFERs have been progressively extended to rural development support and 
environmental protection. The 1999 LOA has given the right to the SAFERs to use their pre-emptive right to 
fulfill objectives of environmental protection. Nevertheless, despite the SAFERs’ efforts to regulate the 
market, according to them 80% of the total rural land market (in value) are purchased by non-farmers, which 
create an upward pressure on the prices. In 2002, the SAFERs were estimating that they should be present on 
one third of the transactions (instead of 23% at the date) in order reduce the price pressure on young farmers 
(SAFER, 2002). 
Therefore, SAFERs are key players on agricultural land markets in France. However, although their active 
role could explain the relatively low level of sale prices on the agricultural land market in France (see Latruffe 
and Le Mouël, 2006), their actions do not influence the level of land mobility between hands, at least in the 
long-run (in the short-run, the negotiations might slow down the transfer process). The result of their 
intervention is simply a change of affectation of ownership compared to what was originally planned by the 
seller, but the sale that they supervise still implies a change of hands. What can be suggested however is that 
SAFERs might not choose the most efficient allocation of land in their selection of the beneficiary of their pre-
emptive rights. 
Land rental contract characteristics 
Legal arrangements on the rental market, in particular the contract duration and the possibility to transfer 
the contracts, might play a role on land mobility between operators. In France the terms of the rental contracts 
are defined by law through the “Statut du fermage”. The original law of 1945 has been modified several times 
(1960-1962, 1975, 1984) but with a constant priority: to limit the landlord’s power and protect the farmer 
tenant. 
The first important element is the contract duration. Once the contract is signed, the landlord accepts to 
transfer his/her property right (i.e., the right of using his/her property) to the tenant over the agreed length of 
the contract. Hence, the longer the rental contract the higher the induced constraint for the landlord, but the 
higher the security and stability for the tenant. Contracts in France cannot be short-term. There are three types 
of contracts. The “Baux ruraux” are contracted for 9 years, the “Baux de long terme” are for 18 years, and the 
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“Baux de carrière”, i.e. over the tenant’s career, are concluded for 25 years. Landowners are even given 
incentives to conclude long-term contracts, as they can receive by the government a per ha aid whose total per 
landowner cannot exceed 8,000 euros (CNASEA, 2006), and the tax on their revenues from rental contracts 
longer than 9 years is reduced by 15%. During the duration of the contract, landlords do not have the right to 
terminate the contract and rent out to another tenant. This is a first obstacle to land mobility. Landowners have 
the possibility to terminate the contract anytime only in order to sell the land. However, in this case, the current 
tenant benefits from a pre-emptive right to purchase the land (with the possibility to have the price reduced via 
the SAFER intervention). This is a another impediment to land mobility. In other words, during the duration of 
the contract, the land cannot change hands. 
The second important element is that contracts are automatically renewed at the end of the term. At the end 
of the tenure, the landlords have the possibility to withdraw their land only if they (or their heirs) farm the land 
themselves over the next 15 years at least (and satisfy the settlement rules, see below). Before 1984, the 
situation was reverse, namely that, in order to have the contract renewed, it was the farmers who had to prove 
their commitment to farm the land during the next 15 years (Coulomb, 1985). However, landlords’ settlement 
is very rare. Thus land is not likely to change hands at the end of the contract. 
Finally, the last aspect regards the contract transfer. Contracts are inheritable, after a retirement or a 
decease, and only when exiting farmers have no successor are landlords free to designate the succeeding 
tenant. Thus, there is little opportunity for land to change hands outside family. 
 
3.2. Policies affecting the entry or exit of farmers in/from the farming sector 
Pre-retirement measures 
Launched in 1992 and modified in 1995, the early retirement scheme in France is, as in other European 
Union (EU) countries, financed for 50% by the EU. The scheme enables farmers to retire from 55 onwards, 
while still receiving some income until their normal retirement age. For this they must have been head of the 
farm during 10 years at least. The other condition is that they must transmit or sell the totality of their farm 
(with the exception of a possible 0.5 ha plot for subsistence), in priority in the frame of a settlement. Farmers 
eligible to the scheme can, on the other hand, keep a non-agricultural source of income, providing that it does 
not exceed a specific level (based on the minimum average income in the “departement”) (CNASEA, 2006). 
 14
Past evaluations of the scheme have found that the scheme has effectively given incentives to farmers to 
retire earlier than they would have done in the absence of the scheme (Daucé et al., 1999). For example in 
1995 it was estimated that 1.3 million ha of land had been freed, to the benefit of 60,000 existing or entering 
farmers. However, at this period the evaluation had also pointed out that the scheme had not benefited so much 
to young farmers settlement, but rather to enlargement of existing farmers. For this reason, the scheme was 
modified in 1995 by, among others, an increase of the financial aid given to early retiring farmers if they 
transmitted their land to new young farmers. The modification of the scheme was a success in this view, since 
50% of the land given up by early retired farmers went to settling farmers over the period 1995-1997, against 
25% during 1992-1994. The evaluation of the scheme additionally pointed out that 15% of the young 
settlements realized on land of early retired farmers, would not have been realized without this opportunity. 
Nevertheless, the measures benefited mainly to successors in the family rather than outside the family. 
Whether the land transfer is to existing farmers, family successors or external successors, the early 
retirement scheme seems to give incentives to transfer land earlier, and therefore to favor land mobility. 
Provisions to support young farmers’ settlement 
Since 1973 young farmers can receive settlement aids, now co-financed by the government and the EU. The 
first one is a capital subsidy, the “Dotation Jeune Agriculteur” (DJA). To be eligible, a person needs to be aged 
between 18 and 40, to have at least a lower secondary agricultural education, to have realized a 6-month 
internship on a farm, to have followed a 40-hour training, and to settle on a farm which is at least half of the 
minimum settlement area (“Surface Minimum d’Installation”, SMI, 25 ha) and which provides work for at 
least 1 Family Annual Working Unit (2,300 hours per year) (Code Rural, 2000). The capital subsidy to 
settlement is 17,950 euros in LFA and 8,000 euros elsewhere (MAF, 2006). 
Besides, regional governments can top up the DJA as long as the total aid does not exceed 35,900 euros in 
LFA or 25,000 euros elsewhere. Regions can also help young farmers covering the surveyor fees during a land 
purchase (up to 12% of the fees) or the costs of implementing improved production systems (up to 1,000 euros 
per year during three years) (CNASEA, 2006). 
Young farmers can additionally benefit from subsidized loans, where the interest rate is 3.5% in LFA and 
2% elsewhere, with a maximum investment sum of 110,000 euros in LFA and 95,000 euros elsewhere. 
Although such loans are not exactly for the farm asset purchase, they are for modernization of the existing 
assets on the farm they just acquired (MAF, 2006). 
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Young farmers settlement is also favored by giving incentives to exiting farmers to transmit their farm to a 
young. In the case of young settlement on their farm, exiting farmers can receive an aid of up to 1,500 euros to 
contribute to the transaction costs, a lump-sum of 3,000 euros, an additional sum of 4,500 euros if they rent out 
the residential building on the farm, plus 4,500 euros if the capital is sold progressively (as it reduces the 
young farmer’s indebtedness) (CNASEA, 2006). This last provision is important, as young farmers, despite 
receiving public help to settlement, are extremely indebted. 
While young farmers settlement measure might increase land mobility by easing the transfer from exiting 
farmers, it does not seem to be crucial. Studies have indeed estimated that in 2000 35% of young farmers 
having settled did it without the DJA aid, despite conforming to all eligible criteria (Boinon and Dussol, 2005). 
Incentives to entry or remain in the sector 
Despite pre-retirement and settlement measure, farmland mobility might be prevented if farmers have 
incentives to remain in the sector. Such incentives might be a beneficial tax income system, or a favorable 
pension scheme giving incentives to keep land in order to benefit from it (as in Poland for example). 
The first incentive, in the form of preferable income tax for farmers, seems to exist in France. The income 
tax rate is lower for farmers than for other business. This might give incentives to new entrants in the sector, 
especially because the rules are flexible and can allow substantial profit to be realized, in the following way. 
Farmers have obviously the possibility to carry out direct sales (i.e. on the farm); while they might retail their 
own products, they might as well sell products that they purchase outside their farm. By doing so, they should 
be considered as sale business, and thus be applied a different tax regime. However, they have the possibility 
to keep the farmer regime, as long as less than 50% of the whole sale is from products that are not produced on 
their farm. However, such behavior is in general limited to wine regions. 
As for the pension, whose fund is managed by the “Mutualité Sociale Agricole” (MSA), its level is usually 
less than an employee’s pension. 
 
3.3. Potential effect of the recent changes in the policies 
It is worth mentioning one recent change in the regulation of the rental contracts, included in the new LOA 
in place since 1 January 2006. The law introduces a new type of rental contract, called “Bail cessible”, that is 
to say transferable contract. The main idea behind this contract is that exiting farmers who do not have a 
successor in their family can now choose to transfer the contract to who they want. In the other types of 
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contracts, it was the landlord who had this freedom (the only freedom to the landowner actually). Tenants and 
landlords must both agree for their contract to be transformed into a “Bail cessible”. As it reduces even more 
the maneuver sphere of the landlord, the latter has the possibility to ask for a price increase when the contract 
is transformed. This freedom is however limited, since in France rental prices are regulated. Each 
“département” sets a minimum and a maximum prices outside which rentals are not possible. In the case of the 
transformation of a contract into a “Bail cessible”, landlords can only increase the maximum possible, by 50% 
at most. 
Such contracts have been implemented following the recent 2003 CAP reform. In the frame of this reform, 
the DPU (payment rights) can be transferred from an exiting farmer to his/her successor, whether the latter is 
from the family or not. However, for exiting farmers with a successor outside the family and renting their land, 
they were not able to link the rights to the rental contract, that is to say, to the land. In the case of non-family 
successor, the choice of the beneficiary of the contract was at the discretion of the landlords, who might not 
opt for the successor chosen by the exiting tenant. The new “Bail cessible” is thus supposed to link the 
payments to the land, in case of tenancy agreements. 
As such transferable contracts can be only for 18 years (and not 9 years), their creation will not enhance 
land mobility. The only provision that might increase the mobility is that such contracts do not entail 
compulsory renewal. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to review the national and European laws and provisions, that might possibly 
influence farmland mobility in France and draw some potential implications of the recent changes in policies, 
both national and European. 
As land mobility is a complex concept, as many factors might influence land mobility in many different 
ways, we attempted to disentangle the issue by considering two distinct definitions of land mobility: mobility 
between different uses and mobility between different operators. This allowed us to separate laws and 
provisions according to which type of mobility they are likely to affect the most. 
Adopting this framework, we first pointed out the main policies that are likely to affect farmland mobility 
between different uses in France. Very simply, one may distinguish those policies that protect agricultural land 
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from competition of alternative non-agricultural uses from those policies that among possible agricultural uses 
contribute to favour one use over the others. 
Within the first set of policies, our review emphasises the role of development planning provisions which, 
in France as in the majority of countries, impede landowners to convert freely agricultural land into another 
use. Such provisions clearly contribute to restrain the mobility of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses 
(especially urban usage). Does it mean however that the agricultural land supply is fixed in France? Observed 
statistics show that agricultural land area is slowly but continuously decreasing in France over the last decades. 
As in many European countries, pressure on agricultural land is becoming stronger in France, especially in 
tourist regions and urban poles. As development planning provisions are under the authority of municipalities, 
the latter have some room of manoeuvre to decide for the conversion of agricultural land into development use. 
As a result, one cannot conclude that development planning provisions make the French agricultural land 
supply to be fixed but they likely contribute to reduce the mobility of agricultural land to urban usage. 
Within the second set of policies, our review points out the predominant role of the CAP. It is commonly 
recognised that support coupled to the production of specific commodities creates incentives to farmers to 
produce more of these commodities. This production increase may be obtained through an increase in yields 
on an unchanged cultivated area (intensive margin effect) and/or through an increase in the cultivated area 
itself (extensive margin effects). This is this extensive margin effect which is concerned here: coupled support 
clearly affects the pattern of land use within agriculture by favouring land utilization to supported commodities 
against unsupported or less (in relative terms) supported commodities. Until the 1992 CAP reform, it is well 
recognised, at least in France, that the prevailing market price support system resulted in a move towards 
larger land area devoted to crop to the detriment of fodder or pasture utilization. The CAP direct payments 
implemented in 1992 have been progressively decoupled from production, the last 2003 reform introducing a 
single payment which is now independent from the chosen type of production, including no production at all. 
Such policy change clearly contributes to give back market forces the predominant role in shaping the pattern 
of land use within agriculture. In the specific case of France however, the retained partial recoupling option is 
very likely to slow down this movement. 
At this stage, one may underline that regarding the CAP effects, it is very difficult to conclude whether this 
policy contributes to increase or reduce farmland mobility between different agricultural uses. What we are 
allowed to say is that the CAP has contributed to shape the land use pattern within agriculture and that 
successive reforms have contributed to restrain the role of the CAP as regards agricultural land use pattern. 
However, shaping land use pattern can mean either increasing or reducing the mobility of land from one use to 
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another. This clearly reveals the complexity of the land mobility concept, which probably calls for further 
definition and exploration. 
In a second step, we reviewed the main policies that are likely to affect farmland mobility between different 
operators. Very simply, most of these policies are aimed at preventing farm dismantling and land 
fragmentation while supporting the settlement of young farmers. Among these policies, one may underline the 
role of the SAFERs and of the land rental contract arrangements in France. Regarding SAFERs, our review 
suggest that they are important players on French farmland markets. Nevertheless it is very difficult to 
conclude about their effective role regarding the mobility of land between operators. They potentially have 
some power to favour one buyer against the others but finally and at least in the long run, in theory they do not 
affect the change of hands. At the very most one may suspect that SAFERs might not choose the most efficient 
farmers to benefit from their intervention. 
Economic theory usually presents land rental markets as a way to facilitate the change of hands towards the 
most efficient farmers. In France, the terms of the farmland rental contracts are defined by law through the 
“Statut du Fermage”. As one main objective of the “Statut du Fermage” was to protect farmer tenants against 
landlords, French farmland rental contracts are characterised by rather long duration, automatic renewal at the 
end of the term, inheritability and administratively fixed rental prices. Such characteristics clearly restrain the 
mobility of farmland between operators on the French rental market. 
Finally, if our review suggests that some policies that are in force in France probably have either a postive 
or a negative effect on farmland mobility, it does not allow to conclude about the extent of these effects. In the 
some vein, we are not able to conclude whether due to these policies, farmland mobility is greater or lower in 
France relative to other countries. These are main drawbacks of this paper. Clearly, there are no existing 
studies dealing with both these aspects and this calls for further work in this field. 
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Appendix: List of acronyms 
 
 
CUMA Cooperative d’Utilisation de Matériel Agricole 
DJA Dotation Jeune Agriculteur 
GFA Groupement Foncier Agricole 
ICHN Indemnité Compensatoire de Handicaps Naturels 
LFA Less Favored Area 
LOA Loi d’Orientation Agricole 
MAE Mesures Agro-Environnementales 
MSA Mutualité Sociale Agricole 
PLU Plan Local d’Urbanisme 
POS Plan d’Occupation des Sols 
SAFER Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural 
ZAP Zone d’Agriculture Protégée 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
